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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Utah Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah
Code §78-2a-3(2)(h) because this is an appeal from the district court in a domestic
relations matter.
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND LAW

On the motion of one or both of the parents ... the court may, after a hearing,
modify an order that established custody if:
(a) The circumstances of the child or one or both custodians have materially
and substantially changed since the entry of the order to be modified; and
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(b) A modification of the terms and conditions of the order would be an
improvement for and in the best interest of the child.
Utah Code Ann.§ 30-3-10.4(1).
Trial courts employ a two-step analysis when determining whether to modify a
divorce decree. Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982). First it must decide whether
there are significantly changed circumstances that would warrant a modification, then
whether the change in circumstance along with all other relevant factors requires a
modification in accordance with the best interest of the children involved. Id. at 53.
"If the court finds that an action under this section is filed or answered frivolously
and in a manner designed to harass the other party, the court shall assess attorney's fees as
costs against the offending party." Utah Code§ 30-3-10.4(4).
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Respondent raises two main issues on appeal: (1) whether the lower court was
clearly erroneous in finding that there was no material change in circumstances of the
parties that was substantial enough modify the divorce decree; and (2) whether the lower
court abused its discretion in awarding Petitioner her attorney's fees and costs.
The lower court's factual determination that there had been no significant change
in circumstances that would merit a modification of the divorce decree is reviewed under
a "clearly erroneous" standard. "We uphold a trial court's findings of fact unless they are
'clearly erroneous."' Drake v. Industrial Comrn'n of Utah, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997).

3

On appeal, the standard of review of a trial court's award of attorney fees is for
"patent error or clear abuse of discretion." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305,316
(Utah 1998).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Although Counsel for the Petitioner struggles to comprehend the Brief of
Respondent, which does not contain a single reference to the record in the lower court,
Petitioner believes that the proper issue before the Court is whether the trial court clearly
erred in denying the Respondent's Petition to Modify the Divorce Decree, and whether
the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Petitioner her reasonable attorney's fees
incurred to defend against the appeal.
After the parties stipulated to the terms of their divorce and the court entered a
divorce decree based upon that written stipulation. The stipulation took into account
Respondent's uncertain financial situation. Nevertheless 76 days later the Respondent
sought to modify the divorce decree citing his financial situation as a changed
circumstance. The Court denied the petition to modify finding that the parties' stipulation
contemplated the very circumstances that Respondent' claims were a changed
circumstance and awarded attorney's fees to the Petitioner. The Respondent appeals
portions of the Court's Order and Judgment.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS BEFORE THE LOWER COURT
1.

Petitioner filed for a divorce on or about may 31, 2005 on the grounds of
irreconcilable differences. I (Record at 2-5).

2.

Petitioner and Respondent ultimately entered a stipulation for divorce on or
about August 4, 2007 (Record at 275-284), upon which the divorce court
entered a Divorce Decree on or about August 31, 2005(Record at 332-340).

3.

76 days later, the Respondent filed a prose Verified Petition to Modify the
Divorce Decree seeking to change custody, modify the child support and
visitation order, and to terminate alimony. (Record at 368-72).

4.

Despite Petitioner's timely response to the verified petition, Respondent moved
for a default judgment. Upon hearing the Court denied the default, and
awarded Petitioner attorney's fees for the premature attempt by the Respondent
to obtain a default judgment (Record at 404-05).

5.

Trial on the Respondent's petition for modification was held on June 5, 2006.
At trial, the Respondent was represented by legal counsel, David Bloom.
Before the trial commenced, Mr. Bloom withdrew the petition for a change of
custody and visitation, and limited the trial to presenting evidence in support of
the petition to terminate alimony and modify child support. Both Petitioner and
Respondent testified at trial. After weighing the evidence and arguments at
trial, the divorce court declined to modify the child support or alimony amounts
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and denied the petition to modify. The minute entry reads: "The Court finds
that it has not heard sufficient evidence that anything other than what was
anticipated by the decree has occurred." (Record at 591-92).
6.

The divorce court awarded Petitioner her attorney's fees of $6,041.40 incurred
while responding to and defending the petition to modify pursuant to Utah
Code §30-3-1 0.4 (Record at 604-606).

7.

Respondent filed an appeal, but has not supplied the Court with transcripts
from either the hearing on March 15, 2006 (regarding default) or from the trial
on June 6, 2006.
ARGUMENT
With no transcript of the trial held in the lower court, it is nearly impossible to

determine whether the lower court made any error in its ruling. Because the Respondent
has failed to provide any transcript regarding the evidence presented to the lower court at
trial, his appeal must fail. "Because appellant did not provide a trial transcript on appeal,
we assume competent and substantial evidence supported the trial court's [] factual
findings." Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1240 (Utah 1998); see also Goodman v. Lee,
589 P.2d 759, 760 (Utah 1978) ("When no transcript is furnished on an appeal it is
presumed that the evidence given was sufficient to sustain the judgment."). Accordingly
since the Respondent has not furnished a transcript of the trial, it should be presumed by

1 Respondent

had left Petitioner for another woman.
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this Court that the evidence offered at trial was sufficient to sustain the lower courts order
and judgment. The Court should deny Respondent's appeal because the record on appeal
is presumed to support the trial court's ruling.
The substance of Respondent's arguments on appeal are two-fold. The first theory
for relief is that the Respondent was allegedly misled regarding the effect of stipulation
paragraph 9. This argument is addressed in section III below. The second theory is that
there has been a material change in circumstances that qualifies as a basis to modify the
divorce decree provisions. This argument is addressed in section I below. The contention
that attorney's fees were improperly awarded is not argued anywhere in Respondent's
brief, but is nonetheless addressed by Petitioner in Section II. Respondent seeks to
introduce a new theory on appeal, and new evidence that he claims, if considered, would
support his claim that the Divorce Decree should be modified. The new legal theory is
addressed in section III, and the new factual evidence is addressed in section IV.
I.
The lower court did not clearly err when it denied Respondent's Petition to
Modify the Divorce Decree.

Respondent fails to marshal or identify any evidence on the record that would
support a conclusion that the lower court erred in denying his petition to modify the
divorce decree. Respondent moved for modification based on his belief that there had
been a significant change in circumstances following the Court's issuance of the Divorce
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Decree.2 The Respondent moved for modification of the divorce decree, and the divorce
court held a trial in the matter during which it received evidence from both sides and
ultimately denied the Petition (Record at 604-06). The record supports the lower court's
decision. Pursuant to Jeffs and Goodman, since there is no trial transcript on record, the
Court must presume that the order was supported by competent and substantial evidence.
Because the lower court's order is supported by competent and substantial evidence, it
follows that the lower court was not clearly erroneous. This Court should uphold the trial
court's findings of fact because, as a matter of law, they are not "clearly erroneous." See
Drake v. Industrial Comm'n ofUtah, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997).
II.
The lower court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attornev's fees to
Petitioner on Respondent's Petition to Modify the Divorce Decree.
The divorce court determined that the petition to modify was filed in bad faith, and
awarded Petitioner her attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code §30-3-1 0.4. (Record at 60406). Although the Respondent asks the Court to reverse the trial court regarding its award
of attorney's fees to Petitioner, Respondent does not provide any reason for doing so.
Pursuant to the standard of review noted by the Utah Supreme Court in Valcarce, the
Court should not reverse the award of attorney's fees unless it determines based on the
record from the lower court that there was "patent error or clear abuse of discretion." The
record before the Court fully supports the lower court's decision by presumption

2 Respondent's Verified Petition to Modify Divorce Decree also included an attack on the
Petitioner's mental stability, in an effort to obtain custody of the children. This issue was
withdrawn by Respondent's counsel prior to trial before the lower court.
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(pursuant to Jeffs and Goodman) due to the lack of a trial transcript. The Court must
presume that the order was supported by competent and substantial evidence. Because
the lower court's order is supported by competent and substantial evidence, it can only be
concluded that the lower court did not abuse its discretion.
III. The new theory that Respondent was misled when he signed the stipulation
for divorce was never presented to the lower court, and should not be considered by
this Court for the first time on appeaL
Respondent contends that he was misled regarding the meaning of the terms of the
stipulation (Brief of Appellant pp. 21-2). This argument was never made before the
lower court (the Verified Petition to Modify Divorce Decree contains no mention of this
argument- see Record at 368-372) moreover the record on appeal contains no mention of
this argument. It would be improper to entertain a new argument for the first time on
appeal.
In his brief, Respondent admits that when he met with Petitioner to review the
stipulation, Counsel for the Petitioner "thoroughly explained every point to me very
logically" (Brief of Appellant, p. 21 ). Of important note is paragraph 27 of the written
stipulation for divorce which was signed by Respondent which clearly states:
The Respondent acknowledges that Steven C. Tycksen has only
represented the Petitioner in this matter and has recommended that
Respondent seek the advice and counsel of a lawyer in regards to
signing this Stipulation. Respondent has been afforded an adequate
opportunity to do so and has either done so or has waived the
opportunity to do so of his own free will and choice and signs this
9

Stipulation knowing full well that Steven C. Tycksen was not his
lawyer in this process and did not give legal advice.
(Record at 311-312) (emphasis added). Respondent had adequate opportunity to seek
legal advice and was encouraged to do so, but chose not to. Respondent acknowledged in
the stipulation that Mr. Tycksen did not advise him. Despite the fact that this issue is not
properly before the Court it is also without merit. The record clearly indicates that the
Respondent was fully informed of the details of the stipulation when he signed it and was
not advised or misled by Petitioner's attorney. There was no evidence before the lower
court to refute this fact, nor is there any record evidence before this court to support
Respondent's new contention.
Not only is the theory of being misled a new theory not raised in the lower court,
but it was not even identified in the Docketing Statement and is raised for the first time in
Respondent's brief. For these reasons, the Court should reject Respondent's contention
that he was misled.
IV.
New evidence presented for the first time on appeal is improper and should
not be considered by the Court.
In the Brief of the Appellant, Respondent repeatedly urges the Court of Appeals to
act as a fact finder to make new findings regarding child support and attorney's fees.
This is improper appellate procedure. The Respondent has not even attempted to identify
any error made by the lower court, but simply asked the Court to make a new ruling. The
gravamen of the Respondent's argument is that he does not agree with the lower court,
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and that he believes he now has more evidence to support his arguments (Brief of
Appellant, p. 27).
Respondent attached 13 new documents as addenda to the Brief of the Appellant
that are not a part of the record in this matter. The 13 documents appear to be what
Respondent claims are "evidence" that he wishes the Court to now consider. This
evidence was never submitted to the divorce court. The Court should not consider
evidence that was never presented to the divorce court.
Respondent's approach is entirely inappropriate. It is understandable that a prose
litigant may not be familiar with the role of this Court,3 but it remains improper to attempt
to use the Court of Appeals as a fact finder to review documents and evidence that the
Respondent admittedly did not present to the lower court. For the Court of Appeals to
assume the role of fact finder would exceed its proper role and would be wholly
inappropriate. Bailey v. Bayles, 52 P.3d 1158, 1164 (Utah 2002).
Respondent blames his attorney for the failure to raise certain issues at trial before
the divorce court (Brief of Appellant, p. 25). If the Respondent's attorney really did fail
to make certain arguments, those issues cannot now be raised for the first time on appeal,
but should have been brought before the lower court.

3 Although

Respondent's brief is difficult to understand, it appears that he has asserted in
his brief that if he fails to obtain a favorable result from the Court of Appeals, he will
seek appellate review of this Court's decision in small claims court. "I am contemplating
taking this to small claims court if the fees are not reversed. Hopefully I won't have to do
this." (Brief of Appellant p. 10).
11

"It is well-established that we generally will not address issues raised for the first

time on appeal unless a party can demonstrate exceptional circumstances." Pugh v.
Draper City, 114 P.3d 546, 550 (Utah 2005) (internal quotations omitted); see also Chen
v. Stewart, 123 P.3d 416,430 (Utah 2005). On appeal, the Respondent failed to assert
any exceptional circumstance that would justify having this Court act as a fact-finder.
Moreover, this is not the proper venue for the Respondent to seek a remedy for any
alleged failure of his former attorney. The Court should not consider the new evidence
and issues that the Respondent presents for the first time at appeal. The lower court
properly denied the petition, and there is no evidence on the record that would
conceivably support a conclusion to the contrary.
V.

The Court should award Petitioner attorney's fees and costs on appeal.

This Court should award the Petitioner her attorney's fees incurred to defend this
appeal pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Utah Code
§30-3-1 0.4.

The Petitioner has been unnecessarily forced to defend an appeal that appears to be
nothing more than ranting by the Respondent over the result in the lower court and about
how he is displeased with his former attorney and how this Court should weigh new
evidence because the Respondent is going through hard times, and has become a
"martyr." Although the Respondent recites various conditions in his life that may evoke
an emotional reaction, he fails to recognize that his hardships are the natural
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consequences of his own actions (leaving his wife and job for a new woman with a big
family), and it is not the role of this Court to make initial findings for the Respondent
based on his "new evidence." The Petitioner has incurred substantial attorney's fees and
costs because of the Respondent's appeal of the ruling on his bad-faith petition to modify.
The Petitioner has been forced to wade through the Respondent's incomprehensible and
misguided appeal and has incurred expenses to do so that she cannot afford.
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure indicates that a party shall set
forth any legal basis for recovering attorney fees. See URAP 24(a)(9). The lower court
awarded attorneys fees for the bad faith petition, based on Utah Code §30-3-10.4(4). This
Court should also grant attorney's fees on the same legal basis as well as based on Utah
Code §78-27-56 because the appeal is wholly without merit and procedurally fatally
flawed.
An award of attorney's fees is further justified by Respondent's failure to keep his
brief "free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous material." See UBAP
24(k) The Brief of the Appellant uses more than 25 pages to propound and repeat his
pitiable story. The assertions and irrelevant tangents are so numerous that they would be
very difficult to list, however a few of the most outrageous are: Respondent's efforts to
convince the Petitioner not to get an attorney (p. 19), Respondent's financial hardship
(throughout), Respondent's confession of forgery (pp. 12-13), criminal background
checks (pp. 13-14), family health conditions (p. 29), the mental status of his children (p.
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27), how his "wife's ex-husband is crazy" (p. 23), what Respondent believes the State of
California is going to do (pp. I 5-6), his wife's job history and workplace disputes (p. 22),
his conspiracy theory regarding his ex-wives allegedly teaming up with his wife's exhusband in an effort to get him (p. 27), the working conditions at his current job (p. 29),
his spiteful opinion of the character of opposing counsel (pp. I5, 25), his opinion of the
"heartless" domestic Commissioner (p. II), his displeasure with his own attorney (p. 25),
unrelated traffic accidents (pp. I9, 28-9), Respondent's belief in and faith in God (p. 30),
how the Respondent is in love with his wife (p. 30), how much Respondent's children
love Orange County (p. I4), and Respondent's claim: "I have become a martyr" (p. 30).
It is a blatant abuse of the legal system for the Respondent to be allowed to foment such
irrelevant nonsense and force Petitioner to incur attorney's fees to respond thereto.
Rule 34(a) provides that the prevailing party in an appeal is to be awarded her
costs. On this basis, this Court should award the Petitioner her costs on appeal.
Ifthe lower court's decision is affirmed, based on Utah's Rules of Civil Procedure,
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Utah Code, the Respondent should bear
the Petitioner's attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal.

CONCLUSION
The Appellant has failed to cite to the Record from the lower court, and based
solely on this fact, his appeal should be denied. He has failed to marshall the evidence to
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support his appeal. He has failed to provide a transcript. He has argued issues and
attempted to present new evidence that are not appropriate before the Appellate Court.
As a matter oflaw the lower court's findings, conclusions, and associated order are
presumed to be supported by substantial evidence. The Record supports the lower court's
decision. Thus the lower court's order and judgment should be affinned.
The Respondent's appeal makes little if any sense at all. For more than 25 pages
he describes various aspects of his life and his perspective and life theory regarding
various random subjects and personalities. The Brief of Appellant utterly fails to describe
how the lower Court erred in rendering its decision. What is clear from the Respondent's
appeal is that he has no idea what purpose the Court of Appeals serves. Respondent has
attached 13 new documents to his brief that have never been presented to the lower court,
and repeatedly insists that the Court weigh this new evidence. The approach is improper
and has unnecessarily forced the Petitioner to incur substantial attorney's fees defending
the appeal. The Court should not only deny the appeal by affirming the lower court's
ruling, but it should also award Petitioner her reasonable attorney's fees and costs
incurred on appeal, and allow her to submit the same via affidavit.
DATED this ).3 day of January 2007~

Steven C. Tycksen
Attorney for the Petitioner
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